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PARTIES BELOW 
This case is an appeal of a final order by the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Control Board (hereafter Board) in the Matter of 
the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility's Permit and Permit 
Modifications, EPA ID No. UT5210090002. The parties below were the 
petitioners, the Sierra Club, the Chemical Weapons Working Group, 
and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, and the 
respondents, the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, the 
United States Department of the Army and EG&G Defense Materials, 
Inc. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is an appeal from a final order of the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Control Board following formal adjudication. 
As such, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-46b-16(l) and 78-2a-3 (2) (a) . 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED. 
A. Did the Board err in failing to terminate or revoke 
TOCDF's original permit in light of evidence of substantial non-
compliance with the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act and 
endangerment to human health and the environment. This issue was 
raised in Petitioners* Second Requests for Agency Action, IR-2.1 
See also Petitioners Post Hearing Brief and Proposed Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law. IR-165 at 2. 
B. Did the Board err in permitting EG&G Defense Materials, 
Inc. to be an operator of TOCDF in light of EG&G's poor compliance 
history and lack of substantial evidence in the record showing that 
EG&G has the necessary character and competence to operate the 
Tooele chemical weapons disposal facility safely and in compliance 
with law. This issue was raised in Petitioners First Request for 
On September 2, 1991, the Utah Department of Environmental 
Quality Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (DSHW) filed an 
Index to the Record in this case. Petitioners will cite to the 
record by the Index of Record (IR) number, followed by the page 
number for that document (the Department did not paginate the 
record but indexed the documents therein). 
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Agency Action. IR-1; See also IR-162 at 18 (Opening Arguments). 
C. Did the Board err in approving the permit modifications 
allowing TOCDF to proceed with shakedown, trial burns, and post-
trial burn preliminary disposal operations (prior to approval or 
disapproval of the trial burns) with live chemical warfare agent in 
light of the lack of substantial evidence demonstrating that these 
lengthy preliminary operations with live chemical warfare agent 
would not present an imminent hazard to human health or the 
environment. This issue was raised in Petitioners' Second Requests 
for Agency Action. IR-2. 
Standard of Appellant Review. 
Issues A, B and C are issues involving factual questions. As 
such, this Court reviews them under the substantial evidence test. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) . In applying the "substantial 
evidence" test and reviewing the record the Court considers whether 
the Agency has made its determination based upon relevant evidence 
that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion. 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). The Court must consider not only evidence that 
supports the Board's factual findings but also evidence that 
"fairly detracts from the weight of the [Board's] evidence." Id. 
(citation omitted) . See also Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 916 P.2d 344, 355-56 (Utah 1996)(same). 
D. Did the Board violate Petitioners' Due Process Rights 
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when it unreasonably limited Petitioners' time to present evidence 
and cross examine witnesses? This issue was presented several 
times, including by Petitioners' Motion Objecting to the 
Restrictions on Their Ability to Present Evidence and Cross Examine 
Witnesses. IR-177. 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Issue D is a question of law not within the Agency's 
expertise. As such, this Court reviews it under a correction-of-
error standard. Under this standard, no deference is given to the 
Agency's decision. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm., 
817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
STATUTES: 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act: 
U.C.A § 19-6-104(1)(f) 
U.C.A. § 19-6-108(12) 
U. C. A. § 19-6-108(3)(a) 
U. C. A. § 19-6-108(9)(b),(d) 
U. C. A. § 19-6-108(10)(c) 
U. C. A. § 63-46b-8(l)(d) 
RULES: 






U.A.C. § R315-3-20(b)(5)(ii) 
U.A.C. R315-12-5.1(a)(2) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 
United States Constitution, Amend. 14 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. AGENCY ORDER BEING REVIEWED 
In 1989, the Executive Secretary of the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Control Board ("Executive Secretary"), who is also 
the head of the Department of Environmental Quality's Division of 
Solid and Hazardous Waste, issued an Approval Plan, hereinafter 
referred to as a Permit, to the Army for the Tooele Chemical 
Demilitarization Agent Facility (TOCDF). IR-162 at 39. This 
permit simply allowed the Army to build TOCDF. Id. Approval to 
begin operations, first with surrogate chemicals and later with 
chemical warfare agent, required future permit modifications. Id. 
at 40. The Sierra Club, the Chemical Weapons Working Group, and 
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation [hereinafter 
collectively "Petitioners"] have made comments at various points 
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in the administrative permit process. 
On June 18, 199 6, the Executive Secretary permitted EG&G 
Defense Materials, Inc. (EG&G) to be an operator of TOCDF. IR-175 
(request to add EG&G to permit as operator), IR-176 (approval of 
request to add EG&G to permit as operator). On April 17, 1997, the 
Executive Secretary modified TOCDF's permit to authorize the 
commencement of disposal operations with live chemical warfare 
agents in the pre-trial burn shakedown process, the trial burn 
process, and post-trial burn preliminary operations process (the 
period prior to approval or disapproval by the Department of the 
Applicants' trial burn performance. The current permit, as 
modified, is in the record at IR-174. 
In response, Petitioners filed their First and Second Requests 
for Agency Action ("Requests") with the Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Board ("Board") on June 18 and 22, 1996, respectively. The 
Requests, inter alia, challenged the permit modifications allowing 
EG&G to be an operator and allowing TOCDF to begin live chemical 
warfare agent operations. The Requests also asked the Board to 
revoke or terminate TOCDF's original 1989 permit. 
The Board held a hearing on the Requests on March 18, 19, and 
20, 1997. The Board waited until its next regularly scheduled 
meeting on April 17, 1997, to hear closing arguments. On that same 
day, the Board issued an oral opinion denying Petitioners' 
Requests. However, the Board did not issue its written opinion 
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until July 22, 1997. 
A petition for review of the Board's decision was filed with 
this Court by Petitioners on April 19, 1997. No post-hearing 
motions have been filed with the Board and no post-hearing 
decisions are pending. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND FACTS 
In 1986, Congress directed the Departments of Defense and Army 
to establish a program to destroy the Nation's stockpile of lethal 
chemical weapons. The stockpile consists of approximately 3 0,000 
tons of chemical agent. The chemicals include the lethal nerve 
agents ("gases'') GB (sarin) and VX and the blister agents H, HD and 
HT (mustard agent or mustard gas). The chemicals are contained in 
weapons, such as rockets, artillery shells, bombs, mines, and in 
storage devices called "ton containers." 
Weapons stockpiles are located in eight states and in a U.S. 
territory, Johnston Atoll. Johnston Atoll is located in a region 
of the Pacific Ocean approximately 700 miles from Hawaii. One of 
the eight chemical weapons sites is located near Tooele, Utah. 
This facility is known as the Tooele Chemical Agent 
Demilitarization Facility (TOCDF). TOCDF is part of the Army base 
now known as the Deseret Army Depot (formerly Tooele Army Depot 
South). 
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TOCDF is a chemical weapons disassembly and incineration 
facility constructed and operated for the purposes of treating, 
storing and/or disposing of chemical warfare agents, explosives and 
propellants and other hazardous wastes. The Tooele site os the 
only one out of the eight chemical weapons sites in the continental 
United States that has an operating chemical weapons disposal 
facility. TOCDF is designed, in theory, to rely on five separate 
incinerators. 
2. SPECIFIC FACTS REGARDING HEALTH RISKS AND COMPLIANCE 
The Tooele Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facility (TOCDF) is 
a hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility. IR-162 
at 198. The United States Department of the Army ("Army") owns 
TOCDF. IR-174 (permit). The Army has contracted with EG&G Defense 
Materials, Inc. ("EG&G") to have EG&G operate TOCDF. IR-175, IR-
176. EG&G has operated TOCDF starting in 1993. IR-162 at 41, 45; 
IR-163 at 503-505. However, EG&G did not have a state or federally 
issued hazardous waste facility operating permit until June 18, 
1996. IR-162 at 41. This is well after EG&G had been operating 
TOCDF for the treatment, storage and/or disposal of hazardous 
waste. IR-162 at 41. 
The Army and EG&G began incinerating hazardous waste, in the 
form of nerve agent simulant in 1995. IR-162 at 40-41. The Army 
and EG&G began incinerating nerve agent in the TOCDF incinerators 
on August 22, 1996. IR-162 at 40. 
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a. TOCDF EMITS DANGEROUS CHEMICALS DURING "NORMAL" 
OPERATIONS. 
As to the technology itself, the TOCDF incinerators and 
combustion units are not closed loop systems. IR-162 at 249. 
Notwithstanding pollution control systems, the incinerators emit 
large volumes of combustion gases as well as fugitive emissions 
into the environment. These combustion gases and fugitive 
emissions that are released to the environment contain a variety of 
highly toxic compounds including unburned chemical warfare agents 
as well as dioxin and dioxin-like compounds which are among the 
most, if not the most, toxic chemical compounds yet discovered. 
IR-162 at 249; PX-3, PX-4, PX-5 (Department health risk assessments 
which provide numerical estimates of the quantities of chemical 
poisons released, their toxicity and resulting risk); IR-144 
(testimony of Dr. Finley, Army expert acknowledging and assessing 
risk from dioxin emissions); IR-145 (testimony of Dr. Guzelian, 
Army expert ackowledging the relatively greater toxicity of dioxin 
compared to other well known poisons). 
The building at TOCDF in which the incinerators are housed 
contains a heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system. 
The HVAC system is designed to filter exhaust air containing 
chemical warfare agent that escapes the processing equipment or 
incinerators and otherwise enters the building during weapons 
disassembly and handling. However, the HVAC is not efficient 
enough to prevent all of the escaped agent from leaving the 
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building by being discharged out the HVAC stack and into the 
outside environment. See, e.g., PX-3, PX-4, PX-5 (Department risk 
assessments assessing, inter alia, risk from chemical agent 
emissions from the HVAC stack); PX 21/35; IR-164 at 929-933 (Tr. 
Helen Sellers, Department's contracted risk assessor); IR-164 at 
1004-1006 (Tr. Shilton, Department TOCDF inspector who worked on 
risk assessment); IR-163 at 498 (testimony of Don Smith noting that 
vestibules into which agent leaked are not airtight); IR-141 at 70-
73 (testimony of Timothy Thomas regarding leaks of agent into 
vestibules); PX. 23 at 185. 
b. THE DIVISION AND THE ARMY'S OWN PREDICTIVE TOOLS 
DEMONSTRATE THAT TOCDF • S USE OF INCINERATION IS 
UNSAFE. 
The main predictive tool the Division of Solid and Hazardous 
Waste of the Department of Environmental Quality (Division or 
Department) used to evaluate the dangers posed by TOCDF is the 
Health Risk Assessment ("HRA"). IR-162 at 35-37. The HRA is 
supposed to estimate the types and quantities of toxic chemicals 
coming out of TOCDF and then predict the nature and extent of 
harmful effects these toxic chemicals will have on people and the 
environment. 
The Division's unacceptable cancer risk standard, ackowledged 
in the risk assessment, is EPA's 10/million additional cancers risk 
standard (i.e. an additional cancer risk of greater than 10 per 
15 
million is unacceptable). The non-cancer risk standard (risk from 
illness other than cancer) is a hazard index of .25 (i.e. a hazard 
index of higher than 0.25 is unacceptable--the hazard index is a 
sum of relevant hazard quotients, and the hazard quotient is simply 
the ratio of the predicted exposure to a given chemical compared to 
its reference dose or danger level). PX 3,4,5 (Department's TOCDF 
risk assessments, excerpts of the three known versions) and 
attachment to Affidavit of Rachel Shilton (full text of 
Department's February, 1996 TOCDF risk assessment) at 52-54 §§ 
5.1.1-5.1.2; PX 22. These are the Division's own standards. If 
the Division's TOCDF risk assessment estimated a cancer risk 
greater that 10/million, then TOCDF would not be allowed to 
operate. See, e.g., PX 22,28,34; IR-162 at 34-38. 
The Division February 1996 health risk assessment calculated 
that a non-subsistence farmer adult (called Farmer C in the risk 
assessment ) would have a cancer risk of exactly 10 per million. 
PX-5, (attachment to Affidavit of Rachel Stilton at 73). However, 
the health risk assessment did not attempt to make a prediction for 
an infant of a non-subsistence farmer adult. This infant would 
receive a higher dose of dioxin than the adult during the breast 
feeding years, with a resulting higher cancer risk for the infant 
during those years. PX-12 at 82-83. 
The Division excluded infant cancer risk in the TOCDF risk 
assessments, and this exclusion was not based on EPA guidance. 
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Id. ; IR-164 at 953-955. As a logical necessity, this farmer's 
infant and subsequently developing child who would receive a higher 
dioxin dose than the adult farmer (who was calculated to already 
receive the maximum dose for acceptable cancer risk) would be 
exposed to a risk above the Department's acceptable cancer risk 
standard. 
There are only two possible explanations for this omission 
from the risk assessment (and for other such omissions discussed 
infra) . The Division failed to include an infant of a non-
subsistence farmer in the risk assessment either out of gross 
negligence or in an intentional (and biased) effort to avoid 
admitting that TOCDF preliminary operations posed an unacceptable 
risk. If they had included the infant, the Division would have had 
to fail the Army on the risk assessment, deny the permit 
modifications, stop the trial burn, and force the Army to propose 
a safer technology. 
There is an addition basis for concluding that the cancer risk 
from TOCDF is greater than the State/EPA standard. As stated 
above, the Division's 2/96 health risk assessment estimates a 10 
per million cancer risk for farmer C, right on the State/EPA 
standard. The TOCDF risk estimate would have been and should have 
been greater than this standard because local dairy products 
consumption, one of the more significant exposure routes for dioxin 
emissions, was excluded from the risk assessment. IR-164 at 916-
17 
28. A survey of farming practices by Gary Harris, then permitting 
coordinator for EG&G, showed local dairy consumption. Id.; PX 37; 
PX 6(last page is Mr. Harris' survey). This information, however, 
was not passed on by the Division to their health risk assessment 
contractor, A.T.Kearney. IR-164 at 916-918. 
Further, the deletion of the subsistence farmer (a farmer 
having both substantial dairy and beef consumption) by the Division 
came after initial Department risk calculations showed a cancer 
risk to the subsistence farmer from TOCDF emissions several times 
greater then EPA's and DEQ's ten per million standard. See PX 3,4, 
38. Apparently, the only reason the Division decided to instruct 
the risk contractor to assume no local dairy consumption was 
because Gary Harris informed the Division staff that the farmer(s) 
in question wished to remain anonymous. IR-164 at 993-94. Such 
farmers actually do exist. Id. Had dairy consumption been 
included in the TOCDF risk assessment, given that the Division's 
cancer risk estimate for farmer C was already at 10/million, and 
given that dairy consumption is a primary route for dioxin 
exposure, the risk estimate would necessarily have exceeded the 
State/EPA risk standard. 
Dioxin emissions from TOCDF pose a significant potential 
hazard to human health via non-cancer illness as well as cancer. 
Dioxin is one of the most powerful poisons on the planet. PX-12 at 
59-62. Dioxin is a more potent toxin than cyanide and arsenic. 
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IR-at 1554 (Dr. Guzelian). 
The United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR) has determined that any exposure to dioxin of over 
1 trillionth of a gram for every kilogram of body weight per day 
(Ipg/kg-day) may cause damage to the human reproductive system. PX 
44; IR-145 at 1549 (Dr. Guzelian is the Army's dioxin expert). 
The draft health risk assessment for TOCDF showed that breast 
feeding infants of farmers would be exposed to 50 pg/kg-day dioxin 
toxic equivalents. PX-4. This is over 50 times the (ATSDR's) 
acceptable dose. 
Moreover, the ATSDR safe dose of dioxin is based on a mere 
fourteen days of exposure (considerably longer than the many 
months-several years contemplated for the TOCDF preliminary 
operations approved by the Department). PX 44 at 5, 6. Division 
staff responsible for the risk assessments testified that the 
Division has made no determination that this 50 pg/kg-day dioxin 
exposure for the infant is a safe level of dioxin exposure for the 
infant. See, e.g., PX-12 at 62; IR-162 at 60. 
Even if one ignores the already high dioxin exposure to the 
Utah (and U.S.) population from other existing sources of dioxin 
emissions (euphemistically called "background" exposure by the 
Department and EPA) and considers just the dioxin emissions from 
TOCDF alone (as has been the focus herein thus far) , the dioxin 
non-cancer risk from TOCDF emissions is unacceptable for adults and 
19 
infants whether one uses the standard hazard index approach used in 
the HRA for other chemicals and the dioxin standard from the 
official ATSDR 1989 Toxicological Profile for dioxin (PX-44) or the 
EPA's risk assessment for the Times Beach Superfund site (PX-47), 
or whether one uses a new reference dose for dioxin derived from 
the data and conclusions reported in the EPA's 1994 Dioxin Health 
Assessment. IR-164 at 876-878 (admissions by Army risk expert Dr. 
Finley). 
EPA, in its 1994 Dioxin Health Assessment study, concludes 
that a standard for dioxin would be 10-100 times less than current 
national average dioxin exposure levels of 1-3 pg/kg/day 
(picograms, trillionths of a gram, of dioxin per kilogram of body 
weight per day). IR-164 at 876-878. This would place the dioxin 
standard in the range between .01 pg/kg/day and .03 pg/kg/day. IR-
164 at 876-878. 
The dioxin dose estimated by the Army's own risk expert, Dr. 
Finley, for the infant of Farmer C (one of the non-subsistence 
farmer scenarios in the Division's risk assessment) is .2 
pg/kg/day. IR-164 at 876-878. This dioxin dose is considerably 
higher than the EPA estimate of .01-. 03 pg/kg/day, as recognized by 
Dr. Finley. IR-164 at 876-878. 
The dioxin dose estimated for the subsistence farmer infant in 
the Division's January, 1996 draft health risk assessment was 50 
pg/kg/day, considerably higher than the ATSDR's and EPA's 1 
20 
pg/kg/day reference dose (called a "minimal risk level" by ATSDR). 
PX 4, PX 44, PX 47; IR-164 at 876-78. The Division's own 
toxicologist, Chris Bittner, as well as the Division's contracted 
risk assessor Helen Sellers, both acknowledged that even if EPA had 
not officially set a standard for dioxin, that the Division could 
have used procedures based on animal studies and safety factors for 
estimating a reference dose (non-cancer risk standard) for dioxin. 
IR-164 at 948; PX-12 at 59-62. Rather than doing this, the 
Division simply chose not to calculate, and not to address, whether 
or not the dioxin emissions from TOCDF poses an unacceptable non-
cancer risk. Id. 
In fact, the Division did calculate standards for another set 
of chemicals addressed in the Division's TOCDF risk assessment to 
avoid such an exclusion. These chemicals were the chemical warfare 
agents GB, HD, and VX, which do not have published toxicity 
reference values. PX-5, February, 1996 TOCDF Screening Risk 
Assessment, final complete version introduced as an attachment to 
Affidavit of Rachel Stilton, at page 11, § 2.3. 
Exclusion of a toxic substance from the health risk assessment 
on the basis of a perceived lack of an official toxicity reference 
value (even though toxicity information is available indicating 
significant non-zero toxicity) has the obvious effect of assuming 
that the toxicity of the chemical in question is zero. This 
assumption is clearly erroneous for dioxin, one of the most 
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powerful poisons on the planet. Rather, comparing the dioxin 
exposures predicted in the Division's health risk assessments, and 
even in the Army expert Dr. Finley's calculations, to a reasonable 
toxicity reference value based on the reports of the federal ATSDR 
and USEPA makes clear that the hazard index for dioxin emissions 
from TOCDF would exceed the State/EPA standard of .25. 
Furthermore, the Division deleted from the TOCDF risk 
assessment the previously planned calculations for risk from 
chemical emissions from open burning and open detonation of 
chemical weapons at TOCDF after finding that the risk from TOCDF 
incinerator operations without consideration of open burning and 
open detonation already posed a 10 per million cancer risk. PX-22 
The TOCDF risk without inclusion of risk from open burning and open 
detonation emissions is right on the edge of the EPA/DEQ health 
risk standard. PX- 22. The combined risk from TOCDF and OB/OD 
would obviously exceed the State/EPA standard. 
Another omission in the Division's HRA is it did not assess 
the impacts of non-stack releases (i.e., accidents or fugitive 
emissions) of chemical warfare agents. IR-164 at 982-983. 
Yet another flaw is that the Division, and its risk assessment 
contractor A.T. Kearney, decided to alter the TOCDF health risk 
assessment for one type of chemical warfare agent, Mustard Agent 
(agent HD) after finding an unacceptable risk from Mustard agent 
emissions without (admittedly) a scientific basis for doing so. 
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Stack emissions estimates of Mustard Agent in the HVAC stack were 
arbitrarily lowered in the risk assessment by a factor of five 
below the original estimate set at the permitted emissions level, 
termed the "allowable stack concentration" or ASC. This change was 
made after draft risk calculations by the Division and the 
contractor showed a very high risk from TOCDF incinerator Mustard 
Agent HVAC stack emissions. PX 21/35; IR-164 at 929-933; IR-164 at 
1004-1006. 
However, the Mustard agent emissions rate estimate for the 
HVAC stack was reduced in error based on reliance on an engineering 
control — the automatic waste feed cut off system (AWFCO) — that 
the Division now admits (on cross examination) is not applicable to 
controlling chemical warfare agent emissions from the HVAC stack. 
Rather, the AWFCO applies, to the extent that it offers any 
protection, only to the combustion units Common Stack. IR-164 at 
1004-1006. 
The Army, but not the Division, prepared a study conceptually 
similar to the HRA, the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The 
QRA, another effort at use of a predictive tool, is supposed to 
evaluate the dangers of an accident at TOCDF involving release of 
chemical warfare agents. However, prior to approving start up of 
operations at TOCDF with live chemical warfare agents, the Division 
has not validated, confirmed or critiqued the Army's quantitative 
risk analysis (QRA). IR-162 at 230-231, 308. Notwithstanding the 
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Division's failure to validate or quality control the Army 
(applicant) accident risk analysis, the Division excluded any 
assessment of accident risk in its own risk assessment. PX 3-5 and 
attachment to affidavit of Rachel Shilton (Division's TOCDF risk 
assessments which omit analysis of accident risk). 
A primary concern regarding this omission by the Division is 
that the Army's QRA is not based upon as-built or as-operated 
assumptions. IR-163 at 501. In other words, the QRA is a 
predictive tool for some hypothetical facility, not for what 
matters in this case, TOCDF as it actually exists. Moreover, the 
air model used by the QRA to determine the likely path and 
dispersion of chemical warfare agents released during an accident 
has not been approved by the U.S. EPA. IR-164 at 773. 
The Army also has a stack monitoring system which it claims 
can tell it whether there is a release of chemical warfare agent 
out the stack. The Army's stack monitoring system, commonly known 
as ACAMS, has not been validated for monitoring high velocity, high 
volume, high temperature stack combustion gases for chemical 
warfare agents and is therefore unreliable for determining in an 
accurate and timely fashion when chemical warfare agents are being 
released through TOCDF's stack. IR-162 at 390-394; IR-163 at 445; 
PX-8 at 109-112; IR-163 at 472. 
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C. ACTUAL OPERATIONS AT TOCDF HAVE PROVEN THAT EG&G 
CANNOT OPERATE TOCDF AS DESIGNED SO THAT OPERATIONS 
ARE SAFE AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH LAW. 
In addition to these predictive tools, the harsh reality of 
operations at TOCDF have demonstrated that operator EG&G can not 
and will not operate TOCDF as designed so that it is safe and in 
compliance with law. For example, "on or about January 9, 1997, an 
employee of TRC Environmental Corporation, a subcontractor to EG&G, 
intentionally recorded false information in connection with a 
temperature reading during a trial burn." IR-173 at 2 (Board's 
Order). 
As inherently bad as an incident of intentionally lying during 
a trial burn is, this incident is far worse than it appears at 
first blush. The falsified temperature reading during the trial 
burn was in connection with the dioxin sampling. PX-1. The 
sampling of dioxin requires that the sample be at a certain 
temperature. If the temperature is incorrect, the sample may 
report less dioxin than is actually present. Among the numerous 
chemicals tested for during the trial burns, dioxin is the most 
dangerous and therefore most important. It is difficult to believe 
that the fact that this was falsified information about dioxin, 
rather than a myriad of other chemicals, is an improbable 
coincidence. 
However, the Division never interrogated the person who 
falsified the information. IR-162 at 268. Nor did the Division 
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take any enforcement action against the employee or his company. 
IR-162 at 2 64. Worse yet, the Division did not know what other 
information the lying employee could have contaminated. IR-162 at 
271. The Department simply failed to determine whether or not a 
broader fraud or attempted fraud was involved and to what extent 
the misconduct might have been on the instruction of management 
from the subcontractor, EG&G and/or the Army. IR 162 at 262-272 
As explained above, TOCDF continually releases certain levels 
of chemical warfare agent, and other poisons such as dioxin, the 
risk from which has been discussed supra. While these routine 
emissions do not, in the Division's view, constitute a permit or 
regulatory violation, the Division does acknowledge that releases 
of chemical warfare agent, and other hazardous wastes, is to be 
prevented and minimized pursuant to Utah and federal regulations. 
See, e.g., Utah Hazardous Waste Rules 315-8-2.6, 3.2; IR-174 at 
section II.A.1. However, EG&G has been unable to prevent release 
of nerve agent out of the TOCDF stack(s). Army Project Director 
Tim Thomas acknowledged that there have actually been six (6) 
confirmed non-permitted stack releases of nerve agent at TOCDF. 
IR-164 at 891-892. 
Further, during the August 1996 release of nerve agent into 
the vestibules (which are not airtight structures, see PX-2; IR-163 
at 498), the alarm to warn personnel to put on their gas masks was 
not sounded. IR-163 at 498-99. In the opinion of one high ranking 
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EG&G official, this was inappropriate. IR-163 at 499. 
During shakedown and testing operations, chemical warfare 
agent has leaked, or "migrated, " to areas of TOCDF where it was not 
supposed to be present. IR-162 at 111, 115; 211; 232, 238, 
275-276; 423; 498; PX-16, 23; PX-8 at 7. One incident involved 
nerve agent decontamination solution leaking through an air lock. 
In the Respondents/Applicants' words, this incident was a "show 
stopper" because the incident demonstrated a clear breach of the 
air tightness of a processing area. PX-23 at 185; PX-8 at 24. 
An incident involving nerve agent leaking from the HVAC 
filter banks into the vestibules (sheds) resulted in employees 
being exposed to nerve agent when they entered the contaminated 
vestibule/filter area. PX-23 at 185; PX-8 at 70-73. In addition, 
these vestibules were not designed to be air tight. IR-163 at 498; 
PX-8 at 92-94. 
Division officials were unable to determine the quantities of 
chemical warfare agent emitted in an instance where agent was 
tested for and found in a stack particulate sample (stack 
particulate is essentially the contaminated dust that escapes 
pollution controls and exits the stack into the surrounding 
environment). IR-162 at 349-350; PX- 7. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that there is chemical warfare agent being released out of 
the stack and into the environment. Id.; IR-164 at 891-892. 
The danger from low level nerve agent exposure is made clear 
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by an important new study by scientists at the University of Texas. 
The Study concludes that low level nerve agent exposure has caused, 
either alone or in synergy with other chemicals such as pesticides, 
adverse health effects in veterans of the Persian Gulf War. PX-9, 
PX-10, PX-11. 
Another serious incident involved chemical warfare agent 
penetrating the first of six filter banks in one of the HVAC filter 
units afte only hours (if not minutes) of operation. Neither DEQ 
nor Army officials have determined why chemical warfare agent 
penetrated the initial filter bank after only two rockets had been 
processed on the very first day of live nerve agent operations. 
IR-162 at 345; IR-163 at 478; PX-2 at TOCDF-4910; PX- 8 at 63, 
66-67. If the cause of the agent filter breakthrough is not 
corrected, then it could theoretically take as few as twelve 
rockets to cause agent to penetrate all filters and be released 
into the environment. IR-163 at 476-478. 
Another problem is that fires have occurred in the liquid 
incinerator area. IR-163 at 509. This, obviously, is a serious 
problem. 
Further, at the time the Division permitted EG&G to operate 
and subsequently, EG&G staff did not have adequate training to 
operate TOCDF. For example, TOCDF experienced a major incident 
with its fire suppression system which Tim Thomas acknowledged was 
due to inadequate training. PX-8 at 40-58. See also PX-23 (Eric 
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Dawson Memo on Fire Suppression Incident); IR-163 at 509. 
There was another incident where poorly trained workers walked 
into the wrong filter unit of the Heating Ventilation and Air 
Conditioning (HVAC) system resulting in nerve agent contamination 
and probable release of same to the environment. PX-23 at page 
TOCDF-000185. The HVAC system at TOCDF is used to filter chemical 
warfare agent from exhaust air. Id. 
Other training related incidents include one in which the 
failure of employees to follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
resulted in chemical warfare agent migrating into an observation 
corridor. PX-8 at 82-86. The record, in fact, is full of various 
incidents of employees failing to follow SOPs. See e.g. PX- 23 
(Thomas to Millar Memos regarding several SOP violations and 
incidents: (1) September 24, 1996: Pages 000465-466; (2) September 
25, 1996: Pages 000460-464; (3) September 26, 1996: Pages 000467-
468; (4) September 27, 1996: Pages 000469-471; (5) September 30, 
1996: Pages 000472-473; (6) October 1,1996: Pages 000478-479; (7) 
October 1, 1996: Pages 000480-481); PX-13A, 13 (Don Smith 
Journals noting instances of failure of employees to follow SOPs). 
In addition, as noted supra, EG&G knowingly operated the TOCDF 
hazardous waste facility for many months (2-3 years in fact) 
without having sought or obtained a hazardous waste facility permit 
under Utah or federal law. EG&G disagreed with the Army's position 
that EG&G obtain such a permit (until after Petitioners' litigation 
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was imminent). IR 163 at 503-508. 
d. THE BOARD DID NOT GIVE PETITIONERS ENOUGH TIME TO 
BE HEARD IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER. 
As demonstrated above (which references only a sample of 
Petitioners' evidence), the Petitioners had an overwhelming amount 
of evidence to present to the Board in a short time, much of it 
newly discovered at the time (the journals of Don Smith, EG&G 
quality assurance official, for example). However, from the 
beginning the Board, which is made up of volunteers, was set on 
severely limiting the amount of time the Petitioners had to present 
their case. The Board allotted the Petitioners 12 hours total to 
present their case regarding this multi-hundred million dollar 
facility that includes five incinerators that burn chemical warfare 
agent, explosives and propellants. IR-162 at 5. Worse yet, this 
12 hours included time spent by the Board examining Petitioners' 
witnesses. Therefore, the minimal 12 hours allotted was not even 
in the Petitioners' control. 
The Chair of the Board acknowledged from the beginning that 
this was a complex case and that the Board had constrained the time 
to hear the case. IR-162 at 7. The Board's Attorney also 
acknowledged the complexity of the case and the importance of the 
issues presented. IR-162 at 9 . As an example of the complexity of 
the case, Petitioners had recently completed a preliminary 
30 
injunction hearing in federal court on related matters that took 
five days. IR-162 at 8-9. The five days had not even been enough. 
Id. 
Despite this, one member of the Board complained that if the 
Petitioners wanted to submit post-hearing briefs, the Petitioners 
should agree to shorten their 12 hours so that the case would not 
impose an additional burden on the Board member's time. IR-162 at 
8. 
Because of the unreasonable time constraints, Petitioners were 
not allowed to present the direct testimony of Mr. Tom Ball, Mr. 
Chris Bittner, Mr. Drew Johnson and Mr. Ray Duda. IR-162 at 32 
(List of potential witnesses) . All four of these witnesses were 
key employees of the Utah Department of Environmental Quality 
Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste ("Division"). See e.g. IR-
162 at 2 67 (Marty Grey testified that Ray Duda knew the answer to 
the Petitioners Question); IR-163 at 549(Board asked question that 
needed to be answered by Tom Ball). Another Division Employee who 
did not get called by the Petitioner was Rick Page. See IR-162 at 
2 63 (Question asked by Petitioners of Marty Gray needed to be 
answered by Rick Page). Mr. Page was the Division employee with 
the most knowledge of the trial burn falsification incident. Yet 
another witness not called for live direct testimony by Petitioners 
because of lack of time was Tim Thomas, the Army's General Manager 
of TOCDF. IR-162 at 33 (Petitioners intended to present additional 
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direct of Mr. Thomas). Petitioners' ability to cross examine 
witnesses was also severely curtailed. IR-164 at 739-740. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
A. The Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act allows the Board 
to terminate TOCDF's permit if TOCDF endangers human health or if 
the Army or EG&G has violated the permit. The Division performed 
a health risk assessment that shows TOCDF endangers human health. 
In addition, the accidents and incidents at TOCDF, including six 
confirmed releases of chemical warfare agent out the stack, 
demonstrate the TOCDF endangers human health and is not being 
operated in compliance with its permit. 
B. EG&G should not have been permitted to operate TOCDF 
after having illegally operated TOCDF for many months. In 
addition, operations at TOCDF have shown that EG&G personnel are 
not properly trained, thus providing another ground on which the 
Division and the Board should have denied EG&G a permit to operate 
TOCDF. 
C. Based on the substantial evidence referenced in the 
statement of facts supra, the Board should not have permitted TOCDF 
to conduct shakedown, trial burns, and post-trial burn preliminary 
operations with live nerve agent. The health risk assessment and 
the accidents showed that TOCDF posed an imminent threat to human 
health. 
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D. The Board unreasonably curtailed the Petitioners' ability 
to present their full case and to cross examine witnesses. This 
was a violation of the Petitioners' due process rights as well as 
the statutory requirement that the Board give the Petitioners the 
right to fully present their case. 
VI. ARGUMENT. 
A.THE BOARD ERRED IN FAILING TO REVOKE OR TERMINATE TOCDF•S 
ORIGINAL PERMIT IN LIGHT OF NEW EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE ACT AND 
ENDANGERMENT TO HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AND ERRED IN AT 
LEAST NOT DENYING APPROVAL OF OPERATIONS WITH LIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE 
AGENTS. 
The Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act ("Act") provides that 
the Board has the power to revoke permits for facilities such as 
TOCDF. U.C.A § 19-6-104(1) (f) . Revocation may be imposed for non-
compliance with the permit. U.C.A. § 19-6-108(12); U.A.C. R315-3-
10(a). The permit can also be terminated if the permitted activity 
endangers human health or the environment or for non-compliance 
with the permit. U.A.C. R315-3-16(a)(3), (1). 
The Introduction to TOCDF's permit requires that TOCDF comply 
with all applicable regulations. IR-174 at Introduction. The 
permit further requires that TOCDF shall be designed, constructed, 
maintained and operated in a manner that minimizes the possibility 
of any releases of hazardous wastes or constituents. IR-174 at 
II.A.l. U.A.C. R315-8-3.2 contains the same requirement. 
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In seven months of operations with chemical warfare agent, the 
Army and EG&G, or their employees, have admitted to six confirmed 
stack releases of chemical warfare agent, IR-164 at 891-892, and 
numerous mishaps, accidents and violations. See record references 
in full Statement of Facts supra (which are incorporated herein by 
reference and will not be repeated for purpose of compliance with 
page limitations). This is in addition to the nearly constant low 
level release of chemical warfare agent. IR-162 at 249. This 
evidence of permit violations by improperly releasing chemical 
warfare agent establishes that the Board acted arbitrarily and not 
in accordance with law in not terminating TOCDFfs permit, or at a 
minimum in not denying approval for commencement of live nerve 
agent operations. 
It is paramount that the Court view this issue in context. 
This is not a case of a "mom and pop" gas station in Monticello 
with a leaking underground storage tank. This is the United States 
Government, acting through the Army. The Army is burning tons 
chemical weapons and chemical warfare agent. This agent was 
deliberately designed and refined to kill people. That is its 
purpose. It is some of the most deadly material on the face of the 
earth. 
The Army has asked the people of Utah to bear the burden of 
storing this deadly material for many years. This, the people have 
done. The time has come to dispose of these deadly weapons. 
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However, the Army has built a disposal facility that is flawed. 
The Army and its public relations units repeatedly assure the 
public that TOCDF is safe. However, Petitioners, especially the 
members of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, have heard 
this promise from the Army before. Despite the Army's assurances, 
the record clearly reflects that TOCDF is illegally releasing 
chemical warfare agent. This is simply too dangerous a situation 
to be permitted to continue. Therefore, this Court should 
terminate TOCDF*s permit until such time as the facility can 
dispose of the chemical warfare agent without violating its permit 
and endangering the public. 
Termination is also appropriate because TOCDF is endangering 
human health apart from other specific permit or regulatory 
violations. See U.A.C. R315-3-16(a)(3). For example, during 
normal operations, TOCDF is continually emitting low levels of 
chemical warfare agent. IR-162 at 249. A recent yet reliable 
study has show that low level nerve agent exposure is a danger to 
human health. PX-9, 10, 11. 
Termination is also appropriate because EG&G attempted to 
provide the Division with falsified trial burn data during the 
permitting process. See U.A.C. R315-3-16(a)(2). A subcontractor 
attempted to lie about what is perhaps the most important piece of 
information during the trial burn, that is the dioxin emissions 
testing. IR-173 at 2 (Board's Order). The trial burn data is used 
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for permitting. IR-162 at 270. 
The fact that the permittees were caught should be of no 
moment. Evidence of this magnitude, including the full record of 
violations and problems reflected in the record and summarized 
supra in the Statement of Facts, clearly negates, on the whole, the 
evidence in the record on which the Board would otherwise rely to 
justify the Board's decision not to terminate the permit. 
The Division's main predictive tool, the human health risk 
assessment, established that TOCDF's operations endangers human 
health. See U.A.C. R315-3-16(a)(3), and record references in 
Statement of Facts, supra. The Division's own TOCDF health risk 
assessment taken with the admissions of the Division and its risk 
assessment staff and contractors, shows irrefutably that TOCDF 
creates a cancer risk above the Division's own standard for the 
breast feeding infant/child of a non-subsistence farmer. See, 
e.g., PX-12 at 82-83, and record references in Statement of Facts 
supra. Similarly, the health risk assessment and record admissions 
of the Division also showed that TOCDF created a cancer risk above 
the Division's own standard for a farmer that consumes local dairy 
products. See, e.g., IR-164 at 916-28 and record references in 
Statement of Facts, supra. The health risk assessment also 
demonstrated that the non-cancer risk from dioxin emitted from 
TOCDF for an infant of a non-subsistence farmer, as well as of a 
subsistence farmer, exceeded the Division's standard. See, e.g., 
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IR-164 at 876-878 and record references in Statement of Facts, 
supra. 
As to an infant of a subsistence farmer, the Division's 
January 199 6 draft health risk assessment concluded that they would 
be subject to a dose 50 times over the United States Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR") and EPA acceptable 
limit. PX-4, 44; IR-164 at 876-78; PX-47 (EPA limit). However, 
rather than face up to this endangerment to the health of a certain 
vulnerable population, the Division simply omitted the infant from 
their final risk assessment. 
This decision was not science nor was it public health policy. 
It was, however, illegal. The regulation does not specify what 
populations must be protected from endangerment to their health, 
which is to say all persons are protected equally under the law. 
U.A.C. R315-3-16(a)(3). It would be simply incredible to believe 
a proper reading of the regulation allowed the Division to 
sacrifice breast feeding infants and subsistence farmers. 
The human health risk assessment, however, only looks at the 
risk from "normal" operations of TOCDF. IR-164 at 982-983. The 
risks from accidents at TOCDF is allegedly predicted by the Army's 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). However, the QRA is so flawed 
as to be utterly meaningless. The Division has not validated, 
confirmed or critiqued the QRA, which was prepared by the Army. 
IR-162 at 230-231. Further, the QRA is not based upon the one 
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thing that matters -- TOCDF as it is built and operated in reality. 
IR-163 at 501. An assessment of a fantasy TOCDF is simply not 
evidence that the real TOCDF will not pose a risk to human health 
or the environment by virtue of an accident. 
Events at TOCDF also establish that the permitted hazardous 
waste operations at TOCDF endanger TOCDF workers. For example, in 
August 1996, nerve agent leaked into permeable vestibules that sit 
outside of the HVAC filters. The alarm to warn personnel to put on 
their gas masks was not activated when this leak was detected. IR-
163 at 498-99. Employees that entered these vestibules were 
exposed to nerve agent. PX-23 at 185; PX-8 at 7 0-73. 
Another leak of nerve agent within the facility was described 
as a "show stopper" by the Army. PX-23 at 185; PX-8 at 24. This 
event involved nerve agent decontamination solution leaking though 
an air lock. Id. The reason this was (should have been) a show 
stopper was because the incident demonstrated a clear breach of the 
alleged air tightness of the processing area. Id. 
These incidents, when viewed with the information revealed 
from the Division's own predictive tools, demonstrates that the 
Board's conclusion that Petitioners have failed to present evidence 
sufficient to justify revocation, termination or modification of 
the permit, at least in regard to prohibiting further incineration 
of live chemical warfare agents, was not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
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B. THE BOARD ERRED IN APPROVING THE SECRETARY'S DECISION TO 
PERMIT EG&G TO OPERATE TOCDF. 
The Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act ("Act") provides, in 
relevant part: "No person may own, construct, modify, or operate 
any facility or site for the purpose of . . . treating, storing or 
disposing of hazardous waste without first submitting and receiving 
the approval of the executive secretary for a . . . hazardous waste 
[permit] for that facility or site." Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
108 (3) (a) (emphasis added). In contrast to the requirements in the 
statute, the Secretary was under the mistaken impression that EG&G 
did not need a permit to be an operator of TOCDF because 
"ultimately liability still rests with the owner." IR-162 at 42. 
The Secretary's legal interpretation contradicts the plain 
language of the statute. As such, it is legally incorrect. See 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co v. Clyde,, 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 
199 6)(plain language of the statute applying the ordinary meaning 
of the terms therein, controls). Similarly, the Board's conclusion 
that just because someone operates a hazardous waste facility does 
not mean they are an operator of a hazardous waste facility 
contradicts the statute. IR-173 at 9 (Board's Order). Rather, the 
statute requires that anybody that owns, constructs, modifies or 
operates a hazardous waste facility must be permitted to do so. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3)(a). 
The Secretary admitted that EG&G had been operating a 
hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility, that is 
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TOCDF, between 1995 and the summer of 1996 without a permit. IR-
162 at 41, 45. Thus, EG&G had been blatantly violating the 
fundament rule of the Act, i.e. operators must have permits, for at 
least well over six months. 
In light of this violation, it was error for the Board to 
approve giving EG&G a permit to operate TOCDF. A good analogy is 
underage driving. The most common penalty for catching someone 
driving a car before they are old enough to obtain a drivers 
license is to postpone the date upon which that violator would be 
eligible to obtain a license. The rationale is simply; if someone 
is irresponsible enough to drive without a license, it is dangerous 
for them to be driving at all. 
Although the same principle should apply, this principle is 
even more appropriate considering the nature of TOCDF. TOCDF is a 
highly complex and flawed incineration facility. It burns rockets 
and bombs filled with a liquid so deadly that one drop can strike 
a person down, dead in his or her tracks. EG&G operated this 
critical facility for over six months without a permit, knowingly, 
and in apparent resistance to Army efforts to get them to obtain a 
permit. This disregard for the law, taken with the pattern of 
violations reflected in the record and summarized in the Statement 
of facts, supra, is clear evidence that EG&G will and is operating 
TOCDF in violation of the law and "in a manner that may cause or 
significantly contribute to the increase in mortality, an increase 
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in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or 
pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or 
the environment." Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(9)(b). 
Not only did the Executive Secretary ignore EG&G's failure to 
have a permit, he also made no findings about noncompliance with 
operating procedures at TOCDF before permitting EG&G to operate 
TOCDF. IR-162 at 77. This violated Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
108(9)(b) as well as the requirement that the Executive Secretary 
and the Board not approve a permit unless the permit applicant 
proves that, "personnel employed at the facility or site have 
education and training for the safe and adequate handling of . . . 
hazardous waste." Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(9)(d). 
As stated supra in the Statement of Facts, the record reflects 
that EG&G personnel lacked the requisite training to operate the 
TOCDF hazardous waste facility, a fact that the Division and Board 
arbitrarily ignored. The evidence does not support the conclusion 
that training of EG&G's personnel is sufficient to ensure safe 
operations of TOCDF. The Board was required to reach this 
conclusion pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(9)(d). Contrary 
to this conclusion, the evidence in the record shows, for example, 
that a major accident involving the fire suppression system at 
TOCDF was caused by inadequate training. PX-8 at 40-53. Likewise, 
the incident where workers mistakenly walked into the wrong filter 
unit, with nerve agent present was also caused by poor training. 
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PX-23 at page TOCDF-000185. There is also a slew of incidents on 
employees not following standard operating procedures. See 
Statement of Facts and Argument sections supra. 
Further, the Executive Secretary considered no information 
about EG&G's compliance history in terms of hazardous waste 
operations prior to approving EG&G as operator. IR-162 at 123 
(Executive Secretary); 198-199 (testimony establishing the same 
fact by Scott Anderson, the Division's Branch Manager in charge of 
TOCDF) . This lack of information made it impossible for the 
Executive Secretary and the Board to make a reasoned determination 
about whether EG&G and its personnel would operate TOCDF in a 
manner that was safe and in compliance with law. This 
determination is required by Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(10) (c) . 
In light of the above, there is not sufficient evidence to 
support the Board's decision to approve the permitting of EG&G to 
operate TOCDF. 
C. THE BOARD ERRED IN APPROVING THE TRIAL BURNS, AND PRE-
AND POST-TRIAL BURN PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS DESPITE THE 
FACT THAT THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT 
THE TRIAL BURN RELATED OPERATIONS WOULD NOT PRESENT AN 
IMMINENT HAZARD TO HUMAN HEALTH OR THE ENVIRONMENT, AND 
THAT ABUNDANT EVIDENCE WAS AVAILABLE SHOWING SUCH A 
HAZARD. 
The Board's regulations implementing the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Act ("Act") provide that the trial burns be 
approved only if "the trial burn itself will not present an 
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imminent hazard to human health or the environment. U.A.C. § R315-
3-20(b)(5)(ii). This requirement is reasonably interpreted to 
apply to all activities associated with the trial burn including 
preliminary pre-trial burn shakedown activities and any post-trial 
burn operations allowed preliminary to final Division decision on 
whether the trial burns were passed or failed. 
As explained in more detail in the argument above (section 
V.A. ) , and in the Statement of Facts supra, the Division's own 
Health Risk Assessment showed that the trial burn posed an imminent 
threat to the health of certain populations. Further, as noted 
supra, the Quantitative Risk Assessment is so flawed as to not be 
evidence of anything except how a theoretical facility may work. 
Id. To the extent that the dangerous events described above 
occurred before the trial burn approvals, these events constitute 
additional evidence that the trial burns posed an imminent threat 
to human health and the environment. Likewise, the inadequate 
training discussed supra is further evidence of the imminent threat 
posed by the trial burns. For purposes of compliance with the page 
limitations, the details of the unacceptable health risks and 
imminent hazards posed by TOCDF operations, as reflected in the 
record, will not be repeated in this section. The details of these 
risks presented in the Statement of Facts and in Argument section 
V.A. are hereby incorporated by reference. 
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D. THE BOARD DENIED PETITIONERS THEIR PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS BY NOT ALLOWING A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR 
THE PETITIONERS TO PRESENT THEIR CASE AND CROSS EXAMINE 
ADVERSE WITNESSES. 
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution as well 
as the Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantee the right to 
procedural due process. See Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah. 1987). The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (Utah APA) further guarantees "all parties the 
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-
examination, and submit rebuttal evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-8(l)(d). See also Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 
P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1991) (due process requires right to cross-
examine) . The Utah APA further demands that, "[t]he presiding 
officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full 
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all parties reasonable 
opportunity to present their positions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
8(1)(a). 
Petitioners need only show that their due process rights were 
violated. A demonstration of a violation is itself substantial 
prejudice. D.B. v. Div. of Occupational Pro. Licensing, 779 P.2d 
1145, 1149 (Utah App. 1989); See also, Tolman, 818 P.2d at 30 
(denial of opportunity to cross examine is grounds for new hearing 
regardless of the other evidence presented). 
R.W. Jones Trucking v. Public Service Com'n, 649 P.2d 628 
(Utah 1982) is an instructive case on this matter. In R.W., the 
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Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to present evidence on two 
issues. Id. , at 629. In light of this the Court held that 
"Plaintiffs were denied their full opportunity to be heard." Id. 
In this case, Petitioners were allowed 12 hours to present 
their case. IR-162 at 5. This 12 hours included the time the 
Board chose to use for questioning the Petitioners' witnesses. IR-
164 at 727. 
While 12 hours may be sufficient in many cases, this was a 
very complicated case, with much at stake in terms of dangers to 
the public. The case was a permit challenge to a facility that had 
five incinerators that burn tons of lethal chemical weapons. "The 
current permit is voluminous. It contains six volumes with 
approximately 18 attachments." IR-164 at 1047. In addition, 
almost all of the information about TOCDF was controlled by the 
respondents and adversarial witnesses. Extracting this information 
was time consuming. IR-164 at 728. 
Despite these obstacles, the Board berated the Petitioners for 
requesting more time. IR-164 at 73 6. The Board stated that it 
gave Petitioners 15 additional minutes and was offering 30. IR-164 
at 736. 
The time restrains imposed by the Board virtually eliminated 
the Petitioners ability to cross-examine certain witnesses. IR-164 
at 725. On the third day of the hearing, the Petitioners still had 
to examine Ms. Helen Sellers, the author of the health risk 
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assessment. IR-164 at 717. They also had to cross examine, Gary 
Boyd, Philip Guzelian, M.D. and Brent Finley, M.D., Dr. Cudahy, Tim 
Thomas, Dehorah Ng, Rachel Shilton, Tom Ball, Chris Bittner, Martin 
Gray, and Dennis Downs. To exam one expert witness and cross 
examine 11 witnesses, at least six of whom were experts, 
Petitioners had 58 minutes. IR-164 at 738-739. 
Faced with the dilemma of examining the author of the health 
risk assessment or cross examining other witnesses, the Petitioners 
were forced to forego their right to cross examine witnesses. IR-
164 at 740. This denial alone was grounds for a remand. See 
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 30. 
The Respondents token offerings of a few minutes to cross 
examine cannot cure the due process and statutory problems. See 
e.g. IR-164 at 769. It would simply fly in the face of any sense 
of fairness to allow one party to determine on an ad hoc basis what 
process was due to the opposing party. 
Not only was the Petitioners right to cross examine 
unreasonably limited, the Petitioners were also not able to offer 
the Board direct testimony of five key Division witnesses and one 
key Army witness. IR-162 at 32; 33; 267; IR-163 at 549. This too 
was a due process and statutory violation. 
It is worth noting in determining reasonableness that the 
Board could have appointed a presiding officer to hear the matter 
to avoid additional time burdens on the Board members themselves. 
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U.A.C. R315-12-5.1(a) (2) . The Board's other responsibilities 
cannot justify so severely limiting the Petitioners' case in such 
a complicated and important matter. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons stated above, the Petitioners request that the 
Court reverse the Board's decision and order that TOCDF's permit --
the specific permit for incineration of chemical weapons, not the 
underlying Depot permit that involves other waste management 
activities -- be terminated. Petitioners of course do not request 
an order prohibiting ultimate disposal of the chemical weapons, 
which Petitioners are convinced can be safely accomplished using 
alternative non-incineration methods currently under review by the 
Army. Should the Court not find this appropriate, Petitioners 
request that the Court terminate EG&G's permit to operate TOCDF. 
Finally, should the Court find this termination inappropriate, 
Petitioners request that this matter be remanded to the Board for 
a full hearing that comports with due process requirements. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mick G. Harrison, Esq. 
P.O. Box 467 
Berea, KY. 40403 
606-986-5518 
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which Petitioners are convinced can be safely accomplished using 
alternative non-incineration methods currently under review by the 
Army. Should the Court not find this appropriate, Petitioners 
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PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR A ONE DAY EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE PETITIONERS* OPENING BRIEF 
Petitioners, by counsel, hereby respectfully request a one day extension of time to file their 
Opening Brief. The Brief was originally due to be filed October 28,1997. Petitioners request an 
extension up to and including October 29, 1997, the next day, to file their Brief In support of their 
Motion, Petitioners state as follows: 
1) In attempting to transmit the Brief by telefax from Counsel's office in Berea, KY where 
it was prepared to Kinkos Copy service in Salt Lake City, Utah, who was contracted to copy and 
deliver the Brief to the Court, unanticipated mechanical malfunctions with the receiving fax machine 
occurred preventing the copy service from receiving the Brief in useable form. 
X 
10-29-1997 11.16AM FROM CWWG 606 986 2695 P. A 
2) Counsel arranged an alternate method of transmitting the Brief (by email) but could not 
accomplish the task in time for the copying, binding, and delivery to be complete by 5 p.m October 
28,1997. 
3) Counsel called the Clerk of the Court of Appeals to advise the Court of the problem and 
also sought concurrence from counsel for all opposing parties on the Petitioners' request for a one 
day extension of time to file the Brief on October 29,1997, 
4) Counsel for all opposing parties, the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (by 
Richard Rathbun), the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (by Raymond Wixom), the 
Department of the Army (by Robert Foster), and EG&G (by H. Douglas Owens) have given their 
consent to the one day extension requested by Petitioners 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court of Appeals grant the instant 
request for a one day extension of time to file Petitioners' Opening Brief 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mick G. Harrison, Esq. 
P.O. Box 467 
Berea, KY. 40403 
606-986-5518 
Counsel for Petitioners 
2 
10-29-1997 11:16AM FROM CWWG 606 986 2695 P. 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of Petitioners' - Appellants1 Motion for 
Extension of Time to file Petitioners' Opening Brief was served on 
the parties identified below in the manner indicated on this 28th 
day of October, 1997. 
VIA U.S. FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID 
Laura Lockhart 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
160 East, 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O* Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873 
801-366-0290 
for the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Richard Rathfoun 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East, 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873 
801-366-0290 
for the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
Raymond Wixom 
Staff Attorney and 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Division of Solid & Hazardous Waste 
288 North 1460 West 
P.O. Box 144880 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4880 
801-538-6170 
Alan D* Greenberg 
Robert H. Foster 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Environment and Natural Resources Division 
Environmental Defense Section 
999 - 18th Street, Suite 945, North Tower 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
303-312-7324 
for Department of the Army 
3 
10-29-1997 11-16AM FROM CWWG 606 9SS 269B 
Lt. Colonel Robert M. Lewis 
Capt. Michael E. Mulligan 
Gerald P. Kohns 
Department of the Army 
901 North Stuart Street 
Arlington, VA. 22203-1837 
703-696-1230 
David W. Turidexman. 
Craig D. Galli 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84147-0898 
801-532-1234 
FOR EG&G 
10-29-1997 11:17AM FROM CWWG 606 9SS 2695 P. 7 
APPENDIX 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS : 
United States Constitution, Amend- 14: 
" . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without duo process of law" 
STATUTES: 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act: 
U.C.A § 19-6-104(1)(f): 
*(1) The*Board shall: . . . (f) approve, disapprove, revoke, 
or review the plans" 
U.C.A, § 19-6-108(12) 
"Approval of a . . . hazardous waste operation plan may be 
revoked, in whole or in part, if the person to whom approval of 
the plan has been given fails to comply with that plan" 
U.C.A. § 19-6-108(3)(a): 
"No person may . . . operate any facility or site for the 
purpose of . . . treating, storing or disposing of hazardous 
waste without first submitting and receiving the approval of the 
executive secretary for a . , . hazardous waste operation plan 
for that facility or site" 
U.C.A. § 19-6-108(9)(b) 
"(9) No proposed . • . hazardous waste operation plan may be 
approved unless it contains the information that the board 
requires, including: . . . ( b ) evidence that the'. . . treatment, 
storage, or disposal of hazardous waste will not be done in a 
manner that may cause or significantly contribute to an increase 
in mortality, an increase in serious irreversible or 
incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present 
or potential hazard to human health or the environment" 
U.C.A. § 19-6-108(9)(d) 
"(9) No proposed . . . hazardous waste operation plan may be 
approved unless it contains the information that the board 
requires, including: . . . ( d ) evidence that the personnel 
employed at the facility or site have education and training for 
the safe and adequate handling of . . . hazardous waste" 
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U.C.A. § 19-6-108(10) (C) 
nThe executive secretary may not approve a commercial . . -
hazardous waste operation plan that meets the requirements of 
subsection (9) unless it contains the information required by the 
board/ including: . . . ( c ) compliance history of an owner or 
operator of a proposed commercial « . . hazardous waste storage, 
treatment or disposal facility, which may be applied by the 
executive secretary in a . . . hazardous waste operation plan 
decision, including any plan conditions'' 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act: 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-8(l)(a),(d) 
(a)"The presiding officer shall regulate the course or the 
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford 
all of the parties reasonable opportunity to present their 
positions." ...(d) "the presiding officer shall afford all 
parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, 
conduct cross examination, and submit rebuttal evidence." 
RULES: 
Utah Hazardous Waste Rules: 
U.A.C. R315-8-2.6: 
"General Inspection Requirements. (a) Facility owners or 
operators shall inspect their facilities for malfunctions and 
deterioration, operator errors, and discharges, which may be 
causing or may lead to release of hazardous waste constituents to 
the environment or pose a threat to human health. These 
inspections shall be conducted frequently enough to identify 
problems in time to take corrective action before they harm human 
health or the environment.'7 
U.A.C, R315-8-3.2: 
"Facilities shall be designed, constructed, maintained and 
operated to minimize the possibility of a fire, explosion, or 
unplanned sudden or non-sudden discharge of hazardous waste or 
hazardous waste constituents to air, soil, groundwater, or 
surface water which could threaten the environment or human 
health." 
U.A.C. R315-3-10O) 
"Duty to Comply- . . . Any plan non-compliance . . . 
constitutes a violation of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act 
and is gounds for . . . plan approval termination, revocation and 
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reissuance, or modification . * •" 
U.A.C, R315-3-16(a) 
"The following are causes for terminating a plan approval 
during its term .-.:(!> Non-compliance by the permittee with 
any condition of the plan approval; (2) the permittee's failure 
- . to disclose fully all relevant facts, or the permittee's 
misrepresentation of any relevant facts at any time; or (3) A 
determination that the permitted activity endangers human health 
or the environment and can only be regulated to acceptable levels 
by plan approval modification or termination." 
U.A.C. § R315-3-20(b)(5)(ii) 
vThe Executive Secretary shall approve a trial burn plan if 
it finds that: . . • (ii) the trial burn itself will not present 
an imminent hazard to human health or the environment" 
U.A.C. R315-12-5.1(a)(2) 
""The Board may by order appoint a Presiding Officer to 
preside over all or a portion of the proceedings•" 
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PETTnONERS' MOTION FOR A ONE DAY EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE PETTnONERS' OPENING BRIEF 
Petitioners, by counsel, hereby respectfully request a one day extension of time to file their 
Opening Brief. The Brief was originally due to be filed October 28, 1997. Petitioners request an 
extension up to and including October 29,1997, the next day, to file their Brief. In support of their 
Motion, Petitioners state as follows: 
1) In attempting to transmit the Brief by telefax from Counsel's office in Berea, KY where 
it was prepared to Kinkos Copy service in Salt Lake City, Utah, who was contracted to copy and 
I 
deliver the Brief to the Court, unanticipated mechanical malfunctions with the receiving fax machine 
occurred preventing the copy service from receiving the Brief in useable form. 
2) Counsel arranged an alternate method of transmitting the Brief (by email) but could not 
accomplish the task in time for the copying, binding, and delivery to be complete by 5 p.m. October 
28, 1997. 
3) Counsel called the Clerk of the Court of Appeals to advise the Court of the problem and 
also sought concurrence from counsel for all opposing parties on the Petitioners' request for a one 
day extension of time to file the Brief on October 29, 1997. 
4) Counsel for all opposing parties, the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (by 
Richard Rathbun), the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (by Raymond Wixom), the 
Department of the Army (by Robert Foster), and EG&G (by H. Douglas Owens) have given their 
consent to the one day extension requested by Petitioners. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court of Appeals grant the instant 
request for a one day extension of time to file Petitioners' Opening Brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mick G. Harrison, Esq. 
P.O. Box 467 
Berea, KY. 40403 
606-986-5518 
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